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NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS BY UNION "OFFICERS"
UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY SECTION 9(h): A
"CONSTITUTIONAL" VERSUS A
"FUNCTIONAL" TEST*
By denying the administrative channels of the NLRB to unions whose
officers have not filed non-Communist affidavits, section 9(h) of the Labor
Management Relations Act 1 attempts to influence unions to reject Communist
control.2 Noncomplying unions 3 may not participate in representation pro-
*NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264 (1956), reversing 219
F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1955); Goodman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955),
dismissed by consent, 351 U.S. 901 (1956), opinion withdrawn, judgmnent aff'd on neze
opinion, 234 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
1. Section 9(h), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952), pro-
vides:
"No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting commerce
concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization ... and
no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge [of an unfair labor practice] made
by a labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit ex-
ecuted contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each
officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a mem-
ber of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not
believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal
or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35A of the Criminal Code
shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits."
Criminal Code § 35A is the Federal False Information Act, 62 STAT. 749 (1948), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1952). It provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than 5 years or both.
The constitutionality of § 9(h) was upheld in American Communications Ass'n, CIO
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See 51 CoLum. L. RE V. 130 (1951); 35 MINN. L. REV. 200
(1951); 99 U. PA. L. Ray. 409 (1950). On § 9(h) generally, see Comment, The Non-
Communist Affidavit Requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 783
(1951); Kearns, Non-Communist Affidavit$ Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 GEO. L.J.
297 (1949).
2. The consequences of noncompliance are designed to induce dismissal of officers re-
fusing to file. See Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956) ;
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325 (1951) ; American Communications
Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387-90, 393, 400, 412, 418-19 (1950) (concurring opinion
of Frankfurter, J.) ; id. at 434 (concurring, dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.). See also
93 CONG. REc. 3519, 4880, 7492 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39
(1947). Some of these legislative proceedings were held when the area covered by § 9(h)
was embodied in § 9(f) (6) of the House bill under which no union could be certified if it
had Communist officers. Section 9(h) was substituted by a Senate-House conference com-
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ceedings,4 nor will unfair labor practice complaints be issued on their behalf.'
Further, the act, as interpreted, allows the question of a union's compliance
with the section to be raised by employers and rival unions in unfair labor
practice and representation proceedings 6 as well as in independent NLRB
investigations. 7
Although the consequences of noncompliance are clear, the act did not specify
the exact meaning of the term "officer." 8 Until recently, authorities differed
sharply as to which members of the union's hierarchy were officers under the
act and thus obliged to file affidavits. -Most courts did not question the Board's
mittee to avoid delays in certifying unions as bargaining agents. 93 CONG. REc. 6361, 6375,
6447, 6860 (1947) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Communist Domi-
nation of Unions and National Security of the Senate Committee of Labor and Public
Welfare, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1952).
3. Noncompliance may also result from failure to file information required by §§ 9(f)
and 9(g). 61 STAT. 145 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(f), (g) (1952). The former requires
a union to file with the Secretary of Labor detailed reports about its constitution, by-laws,
conditions of membership, officers and financial status. Financial statements must also be
furnished to all union members. Section 9(g) requires a yearly supplement to § 9(f). See
13 NLRB ANN. REP. 21-22 (1948).
Both national or international organizations as well as local unions must comply.
Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 11 (1947) ; Rules and Regulations of
the NLRB § 102.13(b) (Series 6, 1952). Since NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341
U.S. 322 (1951), federation level officers must also file affidavits before any "level" can
use the Board. But a geographical subdivision of a union, such as a "region!' or "district,"
need not comply if not itself an independent "entity." Grand Central Aircraft Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 358 (1953); Newport News Children's Dress Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 442 (1950).
4. 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1954) ; 15 id. 19 (1950) ; 14 id. 13, 15 (1949) ; 13 id. 21-22
(1948).
A noncomplying union is denied a place on the ballot if another union or the employer
files the representation petition. Sigmund Cohn Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 177 (1947) ; Her-
mann Lowenstein, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (1947) ; see 22 L.R.R.M. 36 (1947). Not being
on the ballot, the noncomplying union cannot object to an election. H. 0. Canfield Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 1027 (1948) ; Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361 (1948). But a motion
after a representation hearing to be placed on the ballot has been upheld if the union shows
"adequate interest," see note 42 infra, prior to the hearing although compliance was effected
after it Associated Business Serv., 107 N.L.R.B. 219 (1953). Furthermore, a noncomply-
ing union with a contractual interest is allowed to intervene in a hearing and raise its con-
tract with the employer to bar a representation election. Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 115
N.L.R.B. 1202 (1956); Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 172 (1950); Bush
Woolen Mills, Inc., 76 N.L.R.B. 618 (1948).
5. See § §(h), supra note 1. See also 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1954); 15 id. 19
(1-950) ; 13 id. 47 (1948). A union shop agreement entered into by a noncomplying union
is invalid. Section 8(a) (3), 65 STAT. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952). See 19
NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1954) ; 16 id. 40 (1951).
6. See note 44 infra.
7. While initially the Board administratively determines compliance matters on its
own information, the agency permits parties to submit evidence that a union is not in full
compliance. The Board may then conduct a second investigation. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of Louisville, 108 N.L.R.B. 490, 491-92 (1954) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
935 (1950).
8. See text of § 9(h), supra note 1.
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position that section 9(h) required filing only by persons labelled officers in
union constitutions." While agreeing that the act demanded a "constitutional"
test, the Seventh Circuit in Goodman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB 10 sought to broaden
the inquiry. It permitted litigation of whether compliance was required by in-
dividuals who, although not designated officers, held offices described in the
constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, broke with
the Board's test entirely. In NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville,"
it held that the meaning of officer was to be decided not solely by constitutional
terminology, but rather by an appraisal of an individual's union activities, in-
fluence and duties. Thus, the court instructed the Board to hear testimony in
an unfair labor practice proceeding on whether a noncomplying CIO regional
director, not labelled an officer in the federation's constitution, was actually an
officer because of his influential position.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's "functional"
test and sanctioned the Board's "constitutional" test.'2 The Court considered
the term officer applicable only to "those who hold defined offices," not "the
boys in the back room" nor other members of a union's "invisible govern-
ment." Section 9(h) itself did not define officers, the Court noted, but its ordi-
nary meaning was met by the constitutional test. And if viewed as a technical
term of labor relations, the Board's definition, if reasonable, should be deter-
minative because of that agency's expertise. 13
An attempt to resolve conflicting decisions in the troubled area of compliance
litigation, the Coca-Cola case has achieved its objective only partially. In its
leading opinion after the Coca-Cola case, Desaulniers and Co.,14 the NLRB
reaffirmed its narrow view of the constitutional test. But interpreting the Su-
preme Court decision more liberally, the Seventh Circuit, requested to re-
examine its broad view of the constitutional test,'5 reiterated its earlier posi-
tion that the term officer includes individuals whose offices the union constitu-
tion described. 16 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation seems preferable to the
Board's. It is not unreasonable to assume that persons whose positions are
described in the union constitution are of sufficient importance to be designated
9. The Board defines "officer" as: "[A]ny person occupying a position identified as
an office in the constitution of the labor organization .... " Rules and Regulations of the
NLRB § 102.13(b) (3) (Series 6, 1952). This test has been utilized by the Board since
the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§
141-88 (1952). Although the earlier language differs from Series 6, supra, the meaning is
the same. See Rules and Regulations of the NLRB § 203.13(b) (Series 5, 1947).
10. 227 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955), dismissed by conent, 351 U.S. 901 (1956), opinion
withdrawn, judgment aff'd on new opinion, 234 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
872 (1956).
11. 219 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 264 (1956).
12. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1956).
13. Id. at 268-69.
14. 115 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1956).
15. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872
(1956).
16. Id. at 779. The court indicated that the Supreme Court in Coca-Cola had not in-
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officers under section 9(h) .17 Nor does this broader approach raise any prob-
lems of difficult interpretation or proof for the Board or unions; in every in-
stance a constitutional source is available on which to hinge decisions that com-
pliance is necessary. 18
Permitting unions themselves to determine which individuals need comply,
neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit decision meets the policies
underlying section 9 (h). Although somewhat broader than the Coca-Cola test,
the Goodman interpretation apparently requires not only a listing of the office
in the constitution, but a description of its powers and duties. 19 In requiring
unions to file non-Communist affidavits, Congress was seeking to eradicate
Communist influences from each and every level of union leadership.20 Although
tended to give an exclusive definition of the word officer. Alternatively, the Seventh Cir-
cuit felt that its interpretation fell within the definition. Id. at 778.
The Board's definition of an officer, see note 9 supra, would theoretically authorize the
Goodman test. Actually, however, the Board has interpreted its own definition more re-
strictively. Desaulniers and Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1956). Both the Board's view and
the broader Seventh Circuit test find support in the language of Coca-Cola; after quoting
the Board's definition, the Court also declared: "'[O]fficers' normally means those who
hold defined offices." NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 269
(1956).
17. The importance of the district-secretaries whose noncompliance was challenged in
Goodman is revealed by the powers of the Executive Board on which they sat and voted.
This group had authority relating "to every facet of management and control of the Inter-
national Union as well as its affiliated District Councils and Local Unions. Its power and
authority [encompassed] both the policy making and administrative fields." 234 F.2d at
779. This is generally true of all international unions. BARBASH, THE PRAcTIcE oF
UNmoNIS 63-64 (1956) ; PEavsoN, AmElICAN LAnoR UNioNs 64-65 (1945) (hereinafter
cited as PETERSON). In one NLRB case the charge that executive board members were
"officers" because of the nature of their duties and responsibilities was rejected on the
basis of the Board's constitutional test. General Shoe Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 618 (1954) (of
eleven executive board members, only two were constitutional officers).
18. Recently an NLRB trial examiner followed the Goodman view of the "constitu-
tiofial" test. In Kohler Co., Case No. 13-CA-1780, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1956, p. 42, col. 6,
the examiner interpreted the Board's constitutional test to permit litigation of whether an
individual held a position defined as an office in the union constitution. He then defined an
office as any position the duties of which were described in the constitution. Desaulniers
and Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1956), see text accompanying note 14 supra, was distin-
guished on the ground that the employer challenging compliance there had not alleged the
noncomplying individual to be an officer within the constitutional test.
Relying on Desaulniers, the Board overruled the trial examiner. Kohler Co., 117 N.L.
R.B. No. 42 (Feb. 6, 1957). This result was foreseeable. Another trial examiner, in
Illinois Malleable Co., Case No. 13-CA-1866 (1956), had recently denied a motion, based
on the intermediate order in Kohler, to litigate the officer status of UAW trustees, the
personnel held required to file in the Kohler intermediate order. The Board refused to
review this ruling when the employer attempted a direct appeal. (Oct. 22, 1956). See
Brief for General Counsel on review of Intermediate Order, Kohler Co., supra, Nov. 8,
1956.
19. 234 F.2d at 778-79.
20. See NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325 (1951.); American
Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 388, 393 (1950) ; id. at 418-19 (con-
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Congress used the term officer to designate persons required to file, it evidenced
no intent to qualify the term as the constitutional test does; on the contrary,
debates on the section used the term "leader" interchangeably with "officer." 21
Anchored to purely verbalistic distinctions and operating without regard to a
union's actual power structure,22 any constitutional standard is of limited effec-
tiveness in controlling Communist influences in labor. Since the act does not
require uniformity, union constitutions may and do differ: like positions are
present in some constitutions, absent in others.2 As a result, constitutional
offices seldom reflect internal control relationships accurately. The practical
exercise of power, indicated by actual duties and functions, may occur at levels
below those of constitutional offices. 24 Structurally complex, modern labor or-
curring opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ; NLRB v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc., 181 F.2d 919,
920 (5th Cir. 1950). For congressional debates on removal of Communist leaders, see note
21 infra.
21. 93 CoNa. REc. 3626,3627,6382 (1947).
22. "'It is the informal power relationships that are decisive, and these... are shaped
by tradition, values, and practical considerations of available funds, agents and knowledge."
Kovner, quoted in ROSEN & ROSEN, THE UNION MEMBER SPEAKS 14 (1955).
"In reality, of course, [national] control can stem from a variety of sources in addition
to the constitution (agreements, traditions, etc.)." Shister, Trade-Union Government: A
Formal Analysis, 60 Q.J. EcoN. 78, 110 n.4 (1945).
23. Of 57 national and international labor union constitutions on file in the Industrial
Relations Section of the Princeton University Library, 29 briefly mentioned the duties of
organizers, 18 described this position fully. Although all such unions employ organizers,
10 did not list the position in their constitutions. Of 34 constitutions which established a
union publication 4 did not provide for an editor, 9 listed the executive board as control-
ling the publication, 8 the president, 1 the secretary-treasurer. Ten provided for appoint-
ment of an editor and two designated the editor as a named officer. A sampling of 13 con-
stitutions revealed trustees listed as named officers in 4. Their duties were described in 5,
while in the remaining 4 no mention of this position was made.
For the divergence in the constitutions of national unions in different industries, see
Shister, supra note 22, at 78, 82-89. The varying types of business organizations in differ-
ent industries aid in molding union structures. BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM
94 (1956).
24. Congressional hearings on Communist influence in unions support this view. Con-
tinuing beyond a union's creation, the powers of organizers on both the national and local
level are extensive. They include participation in collective bargaining, handling grievances
and generally servicing the organized locals. Hearings Before the House Committee on
Un-Anerican Activities Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions (Local 601
UERMWA, Pittsburgh, Pa.), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 341, 834-35, 860, 3530 (1949) ; Hear-
iugs Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding Communist
Activities in the Chicago Area (UERMWA), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3624 (1952). See also
PETERSON 67-68. Organizers may be among the top leadership in a district of an inter-
national union. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Subversive Influence
in the UERMVA of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59
(1952). The duties of UE organizers are described in the UE Constitution, Art. 12. These
personnel might therefore be susceptible to the Goodman test; but such description is not
usual in other constitutions. See note 23 supra. Moreover, such nonconstitutional positions
as those of chief stewards or bargaining and grievance committee chairmen are of sub-
stantial importance in day-to-day union activities. Chief stewards may even be the most
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ganizations can operate only through important delegations of authority to
intermediate executive personnel.2 5 For example, business agents, full time
union employees usually appointed and sometimes not constitutional officers,2''
may hold important positions.2 7 The influence of organizers, whose positions
are usually listed but not described in an international's constitution and not
mentioned at all in local constitutions,28 is extensive and continuing.29 Similar-
important leaders in a plant. Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor
Unions, supra, 582-83, 588; Hearings Regarding Communist Activities in the Chicago
Area, supra, 3624, 3721; PETERSON 80; SAYLES & STAUSS, THE LOCAL UNIo N 40-41
(1.953). See also BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN AcTIOn 113 (1948).
25. See Brief for CIO and AFL as Amicus Curiae, pp. 4-10, NLRB v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264 (1956). PEERSON 41-55 (federations), 57-73 (in-
ternationals), 76-83 (locals).
In addition to the control vested in the president, executive secretary, general secretary-
treasurer and the executive board comprised of the three mentioned officers and twenty-
two vice-presidents, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union places authority
in local unions, joint boards, regional departments and district councils. Joint Boards
possess full staffs and elect their own officers. They often represent craft locals in con-
tract negotiation, organizational activities and the grievance-arbitration process. Regional
departmenits, headed by an international vice-president and a manager, are composed of
locals in outlying areas. Where there are scattered craft shops doing different types of
work, district councils, with appointed heads, are formed "to stimulate organization and
education in the area covered." EDUcATION DEI'T OF THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GAR-
MENT WORKERS UNION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE ILGWU 13-20 (1955). Trade
locals handle their own affairs and craft units under district councils "usually negotiate
their own agreements with the aid of the general organizer." Ibid.
26. Of 30 local union constitutions (28 of which were contained in the constitution
of their national or international) on file in the Industrial Relations Section of the Prince-
ton University Library, business agents were named officers in but 2. Two provided for
the election of business agents, 3 others only listed this position, and in the remaining 23
no mention was made.
27. Business agents play a key role in collective bargaining, organizing, discipline en-
forcement of agreements and grievance procedure. BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM
191 (1956) ; PETRSON 79-80; ROSEN & ROSEN, THE UNION Mm xm{ SPFAES 14 (1955) ;
SAYLES & STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 9 (1953); WEBER, UNION DECISION-MAXINa I'l;
CoLLEcTvE BARGAINING 160, 163 (1951). See also the model local constitution contained
in the constitution of Upholsterers' International Union of North American (1953) ; h1car-
ings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions, supra note 24, at 3534; Hear-
ings Regarding Communist Activities in the Chicago Area, supra note 24, at 3651. Since
business agents apparently are appointed only on the local or district level, their power
may depend in large part on the form collective bargaining takes in different industries.
Presumably, they are more powerful where collective bargaining is conducted on the local
union level, as in the construction industry. See Pierson, The Govermnent of Trade
Unions, 1 IND. AND LAB. RE.. R.v. 593, 605 (1948).
28. Only 18 of the 57 constitutions examined, see note 23 sufpra, described the duties
of organizers, while 29 mentioned the position without any description of duties. Of the 30
local constitutions, see note 26 supra, 3 mentioned organizers and only 1 listed the post as
an officer's position.
29. See note 24 supra.
"In the maintenance and distribution of power the role of the international repre-
sentative is of some significance. It is his task to aid the locals in organizing, nego-
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ly, a regional director of the CIO, the union official failing to comply in Coca-
Cola, exercised significant control over locals in his region, which covered an
entire state.30
Practical and policy considerations thus militate in favor of some form of
functional test.3' A constitutional standard does provide one method of limit-
ing a much criticized statute.32 Yet it is thoroughly inconsistent with the un-
equivocal intent of Congress which the Supreme Court upheld in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds.33 But because the functional test poses sub-
stantial difficulties of administration for both the agency and unions,3 4 it should
be channeled to meet the demands of daily usage.
tiation of contracts, and even in the handling of grievances. His direct contact with
the district and local officers and with influential members gives him an opportunity
to present the viewpoint of the central office and even carry out some purely politi-
cal assignments.... In a certain sense he is the eyes and ears of the International
who can apprise the central office of the desires and fears of the local and district
officers and local leaders. The international representative helps to transmit the
viewpoint of the central organization to the membership and in turn informs the
international officers of the attitudes prevailing in the field. He is the contact be-
tween the international and the regional and local leadership and upon his advice
and influence may depend not only the progress of the membership and the efficiency
of the union, but also the political tranquility of the whole organization. . .
TAFT, TnE STucTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIoNs 240-41 (1954).
For illustrations of organizers' duties, see constitutions of the International Union of
United Brewery Workers (1954) and the United Furniture Workers of America (1952),
on file in the Industrial Relations Section of the Princeton University Library.
30. Compare Brief for Respondent, pp. 55-61 and Brief for Respondent in Reply to
Amicus Curiae Brief, 'pp. 5-7, with Brief for CIO and AFL as Amicus Curiae, pp. 4-9,
NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264 (1956).
31. Rule X-3B-2 of the Securities Exchange Commission embodies a functional officer
test to determine whether an individual is to be liable for "insider profits" pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952). The
rule provides:
"The term 'officer' means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comp-
troller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers."
While this definition has been subjected to varying interpretations, its main character
remains unaltered: "officer" status is ascertained by functions determined in a factual in-
quiry, not by labels. See Exchange Act Release No. 2687, Nov. 16, 1940; Colby v. Kiune,
178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.
Cal. 1952) ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
32. See American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (concur-
ring opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (1950) ; id. at 422 (concurring, dissenting opinion of Jack-
son, J.) ; id. at 445 (dissenting opinion of Black, 3.) ; Comment, The Non-Communist
Affidavit Requirenent of the Taft-Hartley Act, 18 U. CEI. L. REv. 783 (1951); 51
COLUM. L. Rrv. 130 (1951).
33. 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ; see note 1 supra.
34. This problem has been recognized by both the Supreme Court and the Board. See
NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 266 (1956); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Louisville, 108 N.L.R.B. 490 (1954). The Board talks of the burden on
19571
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The wide scope of the functional test presents three problems of administra-
tion. The first is one of proof: whether evidence of an individual's duties and
functions warrants the conclusion that he is actually an officer for purposes of
section 9(h). It is unlikely any all-inclusive yet meaningful standard of proof
can be formulated to overcome this obstacle. As individual cases come before
the Board, the accumulation of experience will result in greater specificity. Al-
though each case will turn largely on its own facts, some general standards
seem relevant. Distinctions should be made among the different levels of labor
organization. For example, a challenged individual's position as a nonconsti-
tutional executive at the international or federation level should always be open
to inquiry because of the breadth of influence these organizations generally
exercise.35 Nonconstitutional posts at the local level should be scrutinized from
the standpoint of the local's relative independence from control by the parent
bodies in such important areas as collective bargaining and organizing. 3 3 At all
levels, the investigation should focus on the discretionary nature of the in-
dividual's duties and his responsibility for results.
The imprecise nature of the functional test creates a second difficulty: unions
will be confronted with uncertainty in deciding who must file when they com-
ply initially. 'Under the test, labor organizations could inadvertently lose com-
pliance status if an individual who has not filed is later adjudged an officer in
Board proceedings. This problem can be minimized, however. In unfair labor
practice proceedings, the compliance requirement of section 9(h) means that
non-Communist affidavits must be on file with the Board before the agency
issues a complaint on the charging union's behalf. The section does not prevent
a noncomplying union from filing an unfair labor practice charge, the action
administrative efficiency if a test other than its constitutional test were employed. See also
Letter from Russell R. Miller to Harold Cranefield, April 3, 1956, Brief for Local E33,
UAW, on Review of Intermediate Order, Kohler Co., No. 13-Ca-1780, Nov. 9, 1956.
35. See note 36 infra.
36. While the power of labor federations such as the CIO and AFL has continued to
be extensive, see PETERSON 41-42, and BARBAsH, THE PRACIcE OF UNIONISm 45-48, 50-
55 (1956), independent internationals have in recent years increased their power vis-a-vis
local unions. Reflecting centralization of control, matters such as collective bargaining
increasingly are handled by the international because of the growing need for industry-
wide bargaining and because local officers fear rank and file criticism for entering into
contracts and agreements which fail to conform to local employee demands. See Shister,
Who Controls Union Policies, YALE UNivmSiTy LABOR AND MANAGEMENT CENTER, RE-
PRINT No. 8 (1947) ; Pierson, The Government of Trade Unions, 1 IND. AND LAB. REL.
REv. 593, 604-06 (1946) ; Shister, Union Control in Collective Bargaining, 60 Q.J. EcoN.
513 (1946). BARBASH, op. cit. supra at 57-58. The relative autonomy of local unions differs
from industry to industry. The construction industry, for example, conducts bargaining
substantially on a local level because of a lack of effective nationwide employer organi-
zation. Pierson, supra at 605; PETERSON 58-59. The Printing Trades and Teamsters
Unions also generally bargain locally. BARRAsH, op. cit. supra at 58. And different types
of work conducted by locals within an international's jurisdiction may result in certain
locals conducting their own bargaining. See discussion of International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union, supra note 25.
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which tolls the statute's six-month period of limitations.3 7 If compliance is
found lacking after functional test litigation, the union could then comply
and have a new complaint issued based on the original charge.38 To minimize
delay, this complaint could then be given hearing priority.30 In representation
proceedings, a petitioning union should be permitted to comply if subsequent
litigation shows that one of its officers has failed to file.40 In such cases, the
original representation petition need not be invalidated; under present practice
the Board permits petitioning unions, whose compliance has "lapsed" after the
representation hearing, to secure a ballot position conditioned on renewal of
compliance within two weeks after the election is ordered.41 This approach
could be applied to similar lapses determined after functional test litigation.
Current Board practice may also furnish the solution for unions allowed to
intervene in a representation proceeding. If found not to be in compliance, such
37. See § 9(h), cited note 1 supra; NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375 (1953).
Section 10(b), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1952), provides:
"[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more
than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board ......
38. NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1.954) ; NLRB
v. Kobritz, 201 F.2d 156, 157 (1st Cir. 1953) (dictum). An amended complaint is in-
sufficient, however. NLRB v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 205 F.2d 931, 936 (5th Cir.
1953). Cf. Shell Chemical Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 284 (1954); 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 15-16
(1954).
39. The General Counsel could refuse to issue the new complaint if the original non-
compliance by the challenged individual resulted from the union's "bad faith." Bad faith
noncompliance may be evidenced by alteration of a constitution to remove an office in name
only, control through figurehead officers, or the dropping of an officer to an insignificant
position without a relinquishment of his power and influence. Pursuant to its Rules and
Regulations, § 102.13 (Series 5, 1948, as amended in 1950), and § 102.13(b) (3) (Series 6,
1952), the Board has conducted compliance investigations in such situations. Compliance
Status of Local No. 1150, UE, 96 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1952) (whether trustees were to be
designated as officers) ; Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, Case No. 21-RC-1231 (1950),
reported in 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 21 (1950) (no concealment of officers); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., Case No. 2-UA-5588 (1950), reported in ibid. (same) ; Alaska
Salmon Industry, Inc., Case No. 19-RC-327 (1950), reported in ibid. (former president
who assumed another position required to file affidavit). Some investigations resulted in
revocation of compliance status. Compliance Status of Furniture Workers, Local 576, 107
N.L.R.B. 872 (1954) (constitution altered to omit certain positions) ; Compliance Status
of United Electrical Workers, Local 1421, 107 N.L.R.B. 147 (1953) (trustees held officers)
Sunbeam Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 525 (1952) (trustees held officers).
40. Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., (Case No. 19-RC-327, unreported) in 15 NLRB
ANN. REP. 21 (1950) supports this view although the case involved the noncompliance of
an intervening union. Seeking a ballot position in a representation election, the union was
ruled in compliance after the Board requested an additional affidavit from an officer.
41. Black, Sivalls & Bryon, Inc., 89 N.L.R.B. 257 (1950); The Fuller Automobile
Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1950); Milk Products Manufacturers' Ass'n, 88 N.L.R.B. 317
(1950); Plywood-Plastics Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 265 (1949). See 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 26
(1950). See also Tube Turns, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 528 (1952) ("lapse in compliance" im-
mediately before and after a representation election invalidates election but does not re-
quire dismissal of representation petition).
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unions, upon a showing of an "adequate interest" in certification,4 may par-
ticipate in the subsequent election by complying with the act.43
A third difficulty in administering the functional test inheres in the right of
employers and rival unions to raise noncompliance in unfair labor practice and
representation proceedings: the right of "direct litigation. '44 In Coca-Cola the
Supreme Court affirmed the right of direct litigation while noting the danger
42. "Adequate interest" is represented by employee authorizations, acquired prior to
the representation hearing, to have a union serve as bargaining agent. Sylvania Elec.
Products, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 597 (1949). Authorizations from 30% of the employees is
usually considered adequate. Statements of Procedure of the NLRB § 101.17 (Series 6,
1952).
43. See Associated Business Serv., 107 N.L.R.B. 219 (1953) ; Sylvania Elec. Products,
Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 597 (1949); 15 NLRB ANN. RIP. 27 (1950).
44. The right stems from the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951). Over Board objections that compliance matters were sole-
ly for independent administrative determination not reviewable in the courts, Highland
Park allowed an employer to raise compliance issues in an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. Compliance, the Court stated, affected the Board's jurisdiction to hear a dispute. And
the question of whether the organizations involved were required to comply was a review-
able legal issue.
The decision was given varying interpretations. Highland Park held that federations
such as the CIO and AFL were "national or international labor organizations" within
the meaning of § 9(h) and their officers were therefore required to file affidavits. Seizing
upon this peculiar factual context, the Board continued to hold that compliance matters
could not be disputed in unfair labor practice and representation proceedings. Mason Can
Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 105 (1956) ; Cessna Aircraft Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1191. (1955) ; Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Louisville, 108 N.L.R.B. 490 (1954). The agency thus interpreted High-
land Park to determine only whether these organizations were required to comply. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, supra at 491 n.4; 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 42, 47 (1951). It
felt that the grant of review did not necessarily require a right of direct litigation. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, supra at 492 n.14.
Federal courts have viewed Highland Park as upholding an adverse party's right to
litigate compliance matters. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955),
dismissed by consent, 351 U.S. 901 (1956), opinion withdrawn, judgment aff'd on new
opinion, 234 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956) ; NLRB v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Louisville, 219 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S.
264 (1956) ; NLRB v. Clark Shoe Co., 189 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1951). The courts followed,
however, a distinction made in Highland Park between the statutory obligation of labor
organizations' officers to comply and the factual issue of whether a specific officer ad-
mittedly required to comply had in fact filed an affidavit. The former, "necessity of com-
pliance," was litigable; the latter, "fact of compliance," was not. See Goodman Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, supra; Law v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Clark Shoe
Co., supra; NLRB v. Wiltse, 188 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
Confusion and loose terminology have in general marked this "necessity-fact" distinction.
See NLRB v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954). The veracity of the
affidavits is another matter that cannot be litigated by adverse -parties, see, e.g., NLRB
v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 235 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1956) ; NLRB v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg.
Corp., 214 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1954), or even questioned by the Board, Leedom v. Inter-
national Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956) ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters Work-
men v..NLRB, 352 U.S. 153 (1956).
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that its exercise would delay the main proceedings. 4 Although the mechanical
constitutional test adopted by the Court in that case reduces such delays, it
does so by ignoring legislative intent.46 A more appropriate solution would
seem, therefore, to be either a rejection of the right to raise noncompliance in
such proceedings or a frank subordination of administrative convenience to
the purposes of the act.
Arguments against the right of direct litigation emphasize the delay in-
herent in the adjudication of issues collateral to those for which the adminis-
trative proceeding is held.47 In addition, since the NLRB alone has the ex-
pertise needed to cope with labor problems, 48 it might be contended that com-
pliance should be left to the Board's determination in independent proceedings
directed to the sole purpose of investigating compliance status.49 A third argu-
ment would stress the opportunity direct litigation gives employers and rival
unions to raise frivolous contentions either for the purpose of delay or in order
45. 350 U.S. at 267-68. The Court rejected the Board's view and adopted that of the
federal courts. See note 44 supra.
In spite of the decision, disagreement still continues. The Board has not abandoned
its hostility to the right of direct litigation. In a series of recent decisions the Board
declared litigation permissible only on "interpretation of the statutory language" of § 9(h).
E.g., Desaulniers and Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1956); California Furniture Shops, Ltd.,
115 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1956); Crenshaw's, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1374 (1956). By this language
the agency apparently intended to bar direct litigation of whethe" an individual was an
officer of the union even under the constitutional test. See Brief for the General Counsel
on Review of Intermediate Order, pp. 2-4, Kohler Co., No. 13-Ca-1780, Nov. 8, 1956.
The First Circuit has interpreted Coca-Cola as abolishing the distinction between
necessity and fact of compliance entirely. In NLRB v. Puerto Rico Food Products Corp.,
232 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1956), the court recognized a right to litigate questions of whether
affidavits by individuals admittedly required to comply have actually been filed. A prefer-
able interpretation would be that the Supreme Court did not reject the distinction entirely
but rather only the Board's restrictive view of what that distinction was. See NLRB v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 267 (1956); Brief for Petitioner, pp.
46-48, NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, supra. While appearing to broaden
the scope of compliance litigation, the First Circuit's decision will probably make few
changes in present practice. The Board will not rule the union in compliance unless all
required affidavits have been submitted and will supply this filing information to parties in
interest prior to any proceeding. Sunbeam Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 844 (1951).
46. See notes 20 and 21 supra and accompanying text. See also text at -note 33 supra.
47. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 268 (1956);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 108 N.L.R.B. 490 (1954); Lion Oil Co., 76 N.L.R.B.
565 (1948); 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1954).
48. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956); NLRB
v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327 (1951) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter,
J.) ; id. at 327-28 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.) ; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 11.1, 130 (1944).
49. The Board has consistently sought to maintain this point of view. See, e.g., Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 108 N.L.R.B. 490 (1954) (unfair labor practice proceed-
ing) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 428 (1949) (representation proceeding) ;
cf. Lion Oil Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 565 (1948) (representation proceeding). See also 19 NLRB
ANN. REP. 10 (1954) ; 16 id. 47 (1951) ; 15 id. 19 (1950) ; 14 id. 15 (1949) ; 13 id. 24
(1948).
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to avoid a decision on the merits of the case. In favor of the right of direct
litigation is the contention that adverse litigants, although motivated by self-
interest,50 serve to further the purposes of the act by supplementing the super-
visory role of an already over-burdened Board.5 ' As a matter of statutory
construction, it may also be argued that compliance is a prerequisite to the
Board's jurisdiction in representation and unfair labor practice proceedings
and may consequently be raised by any party. 52
Coca-Cola's recognition of the right of direct litigation may be criticized or
supported for the reasons stated above, but the existence of such a right is not
inconsistent with a functional test. Although, as a dictum in the decision sug-
gests, the right of direct litigation subordinates administrative convenience to
the policy of section 9(h),O the test can be so administered as to work a mini-
mum of delay. In the first instance, the number of claims would be greatly re-
duced were the Board to adhere to a functional test in its initial administrative
determinations on compliance. Allegations of noncompliance should be speci-
fied at the beginning of the proceedings; if employers or rival unions fail to
claim noncompliance seasonably, they should be deemed to have waived any
objections. 54 Compliance matters should be litigated first and if noncompliance
50. If an individual officer refuses to file, an employer may escape liability for an un-
fair labor practice or a rival may secure the noncomplying union's elimination from the
representation election. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
51. Because of a large caseload, the Board amended its rules in 1954 to reduce the
scope of its jurisdiction. See Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954), particular-
ly at 497.
52. Compliance matters were held to be jurisdictional in NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951). Despite this decision the Sixth Circuit has at times refused
to so view them. It has maintained that failure to comply would only revoke a union's
standing before the Board and act as a bar to the proceedings as does the statute of
limitations. NLRB v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 209 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB
v. Wiltse, 188 F.2d 917, 921 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951). While the basis
for this rationale came from a pre-Highland Park Fourth Circuit decision, NLRB v.
Greensboro Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 F.2d 840, 845 (4th Cir. 1950), the Sixth Circuit
in Sharples, supra, apparently overlooked its own earlier decision in which it labelled com-
pliance jurisdictional. NLRB v. Alside, Inc., 192 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1951). But for the
most part, Highland Park's jurisdictional meaning is recognized. See Goodman Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 775, 776 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); NLRB v.
Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 205 F.2d 931, 934, 937 (5th Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. Happ Bros.
Co., 196 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1952). See also NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 266 (1.956) ; NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375, 379 (1953).
53. 350 U.S. at 268.
54. The Board, in determining the procedure to be followed during its hearings, can
specify that compliance matters be raised initially. See § 6, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1952). Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11
(1952); §§ 1001(e) and 1002(a) recognize an agency's province to determine its pro-
cedural rules.
However, since compliance has been adjudged a jurisdictional matter, see note 52 supra,
a reviewing court might refuse to uphold a waiver of the issue. Such a result seems un-
likely; in practice, courts have not treated compliance in a strict jurisdictional senst-.
Courts have found a waiver by relying on § 10(e), 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
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is shown, the affected union should be denied access to the Board's processes
only if it refuses the opportunity to complyY5 In addition to requiring detailed
allegations of noncompliance, trial examiners could impose strict criteria of
relevancy and materiality of proof at the hearing. Although these recommen-
dations would not eliminate inconvenience, they would minimize the possibil-
ities of abuse while permitting a standard of litigation that more closely con-
forms to the purposes of section 9(h).
(1952), which prevents the entering of additional evidence before a court of appeals absent
a showing of reasonable grounds for failure to litigate the matter before the Board. See
NLRB v. Vulcan Forging Co., 188 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1951) (leave to admit additional
evidence of noncompliance denied for failure to raise issue before Board even though Board
could not then have passed on the issue) ; cf. NLRB v. Shedd-Brown Mfg. Co., 213 F.2d
163, 165-67 (7th Cir. 1954).
If a motion to dismiss a proceeding is denied either on the merits or for failure to raise
a timely objection, the litigant has no right to appeal the issue to the Board immediately.
Such an appeal can be taken only upon the Board's special permission. Rules and Regula-
tions of the NLRB, § 102.26 (unfair labor practice proceeding), § 102.57(c) (representa-
tion proceeding) (Series 6, 1956). But if a motion to dismiss is granted, Board review can
be obtained pursuant to § 102.27 (unfair labor practice complaint) or § 102.57(a) (rep-
resentation petition).
No interlocutory appeal to the circuit courts is available in any of the above situations.
But if the Board dismisses a complaint in whole or in part, the determination is considered
a final administrative order under § 10(f), 61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1952) ;
Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Laundry Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 701, 703 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307
(1st Cir. 1948). See also Administrative Procedure Act, supra, §§ 1001(d), 1009(c).
55. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
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